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Introduction
In her very interesting paper, “Peter Singer on Expendability,” L. A. Kemmerer re-examines Peter Singer’s utilitarian
argument implying that some beings are replaceable and the
implications of this argument for the issue of treating animals
(Kemmerer 2007). She argues that:
Singer’s replaceability argument is flawed because
he categorizes lives which are both happy and sad as
singularly happy. His acceptance of painless death is
problematic because Singer, a preference utilitarian,
ignores the preference of almost every living being to
maintain existence. Finally, Singer’s replaceability argument does not take into account the effect of killing
on the one killed, or on their larger community (2007,
9).
I will attempt here to defend Singer, and more generally utilitarianism (including the principle of replaceability), against
these objections. I will argue that, given a utilitarian outlook,
some animals are indeed replaceable or, as Kemmerer claims,
expendable, at least in principle. But I will also argue that few
animals are replaceable in practice.

Utilitarianism and the “Total” Versus
“Prior Existence” Views
To put things very broadly, utilitarian theory requires us to
bring about the best balance of utility. On this view, an action
(or a practice or a policy) is morally right just in case it maximizes utility or intrinsic value or, as contemporary utilitarians
sometimes say, the best balance of benefits and harms. That is,
on this view, the right action must be such that there is no alter-
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native to it that would bring about a better balance of intrinsic
value.
Now, this general utilitarian idea requires several qualifications. In particular, it needs to be supplemented with some account of what counts as an intrinsic value and what kinds of
things are intrinsically good and bad. Sometimes Singer writes
as if he were leaning toward a version of hedonism. For example, he maintains that, from a moral point of view, no suffering of any sentient being can be simply ignored. On other
occasions, however, he seems to lean toward a preference satisfaction theory of intrinsic value. On this view, it is good when
someone’s rational preferences and desires are fulfilled and it is
bad when they are thwarted. There are, of course, close connections between sentience (understood as ability to feel pain and
pleasure) and what is in someone’s interests. As Singer puts it
in his seminal Animal Liberation:
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be
satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in
the interest of a stone to be kicked along the road by a
schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it
cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. The capacity
for suffering and enjoyment is, however, not only necessary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being has
interests—at an absolute minimum, an interest in not
suffering. A mouse, for example, does have an interest
in not being kicked along the road, because it will suffer if it is (1990, 7-8).
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In this paper, we will put to one side a debate between various accounts of intrinsic value, and relative merits of hedonism
versus the interests (and preferences) satisfaction theories. It
is important to notice, however, that both views seem to have
similar implications with regard to the issue of the value of life.
In particular, Singer does not think that life per se (that is, simply being alive) is intrinsically good. Rather, from his point of
view, being alive is good only in so far as it allows some being
to exemplify states of affairs that are intrinsically good or bad,
i.e., feeling pleasure or pain, fulfillment or frustration of one’s
desires and preferences, and so on.
This aspect of Singer’s theory seems to lead him to some difficulties. For it seems to imply that, as long as the total balance
of utility remains the same, it is all right to kill someone and
replace this being with someone else who exemplifies similar
values. To see how these difficulties arise, it will help to distinguish two different interpretations of the utilitarian principle,
namely, what may be called the “total” version of utilitarianism
and the so-called “prior existence” view.
Singer characterizes the “total” view as requiring us to increase the total balance of utility “irrespective of whether this
is done by increasing the pleasure of existing beings, or increasing the number of beings who exist” (Singer 1979, 147).
In contrast, the “prior existence” view considers the pleasures
and pains only of beings that already exist (147). (Again, let us
remind ourselves that this way of introducing the “total” and
the “prior existence” views puts emphasis on utility being dependent on pleasure and pain. As we have noticed earlier, ultimately Singer seems to lean toward the preference-satisfaction
theory of intrinsic value rather than toward hedonism.)

© Between the Species, 2011

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 14, Issue 1

85
Stefan Sencerz

Kemmerer correctly recognizes that, because of some alleged internal problems with the “prior existence” view, Singer
accepts the “total” view. To bring these problems into sharper
focus, let us start with the question whether the possible pleasure of a non-existing child (i.e., a merely possible child) is a
reason to bring him into existence. Singer observes that, generally, the pain felt by such a potential child is a reason not
to bring this child into existence. For example, a woman who
knows that her potential child would be extremely unhappy has
a good reason not to become pregnant. If we accept, however,
that a potential suffering is a reason not to bring this being into
existence, then as a matter of symmetry, it seems that the potential pleasure felt by this child would be a reason to bring this
being into existence.
Singer reaches a similar conclusion by means of a slightly
different argument, summarized in the following passage:
[I]t does not seem wrong for the government of an underpopulated country to encourage its people to have
more children so that the population will rise by, say,
one million. Yet of this million, we can be sure that
at least one will be thoroughly miserable. If it is not
wrong to create the million, but would be wrong to create the single miserable being, the obvious explanation
is that there is value in the creation of the 999,999—
or however many it will be—whose lives are happy
(1979, 150).
Kemmerer thinks that Singer’s arguments stem from a mistaken
assumption that, except for few who are undeniably miserable,
lives are generally happy. So, their happiness outweighs the
suffering of the unhappy ones. That is, she attributes to Singer
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the view that, for the vast majority of humans, their existence
is “an undisputed positive/pleasure” (Kemmerer 2007, 4). Contrary to this view, Kemmerer thinks that it is more reasonable
to assign “a neutral or mixed value to life.” That is, she thinks
that a not-yet-conceived entity “will most likely find a mixture
of both pleasure and pain throughout life” and, furthermore,
that “the pain ratio will be higher in the birth of an abnormal
child—for the child, the parent, and all involved” (4). All of
this seems well justified. This brings her to make the following
point against Singer:
If we rewrite Singer’s conundrum, eliminating his assessment of most lives as an automatic (and it would
seem exclusive) pleasure, the question looks very different: if the pleasure and pain a normal child is apt to
experience is not a reason for bringing it into the world,
why is the certain increased pain of a defective child
a reason against bringing it into the world? The question no longer appears asymmetrical or perplexing. If
the anticipated mix of pleasure and pain is altered so
that increased pain is expected, one might reasonably
choose not to parent.
If we do not calculate the average life as exclusively
“pleasure,” Singer’s reason for rejecting the “prior existence” view (an asymmetry created by a fallacious
assumption) evaporates (Kemmerer 2007, 4).
Now, I fail to see how exactly Kemmerer’s argument is supposed to go. For I fail to see why her way of viewing life, as
containing the mixture of both pleasure and pain, helps her to
establish her position and her argument against Singer. Thus, I
will argue now for two points. First, just like Kemmerer would
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like him to do, Singer in fact assumes that lives normally contain a mixture of both pleasure and pain (as opposed to assuming the view attributed to him by Kemmerer, i.e., that lives contain only pleasure). Second, when we recognize the fact that
normal lives contain such mixtures, there are still very strong
reasons to think that the “total” view is correct and the “prior
existence” view is not.
To begin, let us consider two cases that help Singer arrive
at his conclusions and which are borrowed from Derek Parfit,
who pioneered a serious inquiry into the issue of how we should
treat merely potential (as opposed to not yet existing but nevertheless actual future) people and their interests (Parfit 1976;
1984, 367; cf. Singer 1993, 123ff). In the first example, a three
months pregnant woman receives from her doctor a bit of bad
news combined with a bit of good news. The bad news is that
the fetus has a defect that will significantly diminish the future
child’s quality of life. However, the child will not be affected
so adversely as to make his life utterly miserable, or not worth
living at all. The good news is that this defect is easily treatable.
All the woman has to do is to take a pill that will have no negative side effect for her or her future children. Parfit claims, and
Singer agrees, that the woman ought to take the pill and make
sure that she will have a healthy child (Singer 1993, 123). It is
important to notice now that, contrary to the view attributed to
him by Kemmerer, Singer perceives the life of this child as containing a mixture of both pleasure and pain. Furthermore, let
us also recognize that both a handicapped child and a healthy
one would have a life that is worth living (i.e., a life in which
the child’s pleasure outweighs pain). Singer and Parfit agree,
finally, that the woman should take the pill because a healthy
child will have a better quality of life and consequently a better
mixture of pleasure and pain.
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The second case discussed by Singer includes a slight modification. In this case the woman visits her doctor before she becomes pregnant, when she is about to stop using contraception.
She also receives a bit of bad news accompanied by a bit of good
news. Namely, she learns that, if she conceives a child within
the next three months, her offspring will be born with a serious
defect. This defect would impact his life in the same way as
the defect discussed in the previous case would affect the first
child. Unfortunately, and here is the difference from the previous case, this defect is not treatable. That is, the woman cannot
simply take a pill and assure that she will have a completely
healthy child. Nevertheless, she also receives some good news.
Namely, she learns that if she waits only three months, her future child will not have any defect at all and thus will develop
normally. Singer again agrees with Parfit that the woman ought
to wait three months, i.e., until she can conceive a completely
healthy child. He maintains that, if the first woman did not take
a pill or if the second woman did not wait three months, each
of them would do something wrong. Furthermore, other things
being equal (e.g., the waiting period is not harder for the second
woman than taking a pill is for the first), each of them would do
something that is equally bad or wrong. But why?
The first case can be explained in an easy way. If the woman
does not take the pill she will allow her child to be harmed.
More precisely, she will make her child worse off than this
child would have been otherwise. So far, this case does not lend
any support to either the “total” or the “prior existence” view.
But, as Singer observes, the second case is not open to the same
explanation. For we cannot now argue that, if the woman does
not wait, she will make someone worse off than this very being
would have been otherwise, i.e., if she decided to wait. The reason for this is that the child does not yet exist. To see this point
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more sharply, suppose that the child from the second example
grows up and one day claims what follows. “You should have
waited three months. If you waited, I would not have been born
with this disability and my life would have been significantly
better.” The woman could simply respond as follows:
If I had waited three months before becoming pregnant
you would have never existed. I would have produced
another child, from a different egg and different sperm.
Your life, even with your disability, is definitely above
the point at which life is so miserable that it ceases to
be worth living. You never had a chance of existing
without the disability. So, I have not harmed you at all
(Singer 1993, 124).
So, what follows from this example? In this case, the wrongness of not waiting three months does not consist in harming
the actually existing child, for the actual child has life which
is as good as it possibly can be for this very child. But, then,
why is it wrong? One possibility is that it is wrong because the
woman did not bring into existence the possible child she could
have had and would have had otherwise, i.e., if she decided to
wait three months. As Singer observes, “this option commits
us to the total view, and implies that, other things being equal,
it is good to bring into existence children without disabilities”
(Singer 1993, 124). There is, however, an even more satisfactory answer to our question about the wrongness of her actions;
namely:
the wrong-doing lies... in bringing into existence a
child with a less satisfactory quality of life than another
child whom one could have brought into existence. In
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other words, we have failed to bring about the best possible outcome (Singer 1993, 124-125).
This argument implies, however, that not only the interests of
already existing beings but also the interests of possible beings matter when we make moral decisions. That is, again, this
answer seems to commit us to the “total” view as the correct
interpretation of utilitarianism.
To sum up, in this section we considered Kemmerer’s objections to Singer’s version of utilitarianism. I have argued that,
contrary to her interpretation of Singer, he assumes that typically lives include a mixture of both pleasure and pain (or other
beneficial and harmful states). Furthermore, I have revisited
Singer’s reasons in support of the “total” view as the correct
interpretation of utilitarianism. These reasons seem to be convincing.

From the “Total” View to Replaceability
Suppose that a certain being, X, has on balance an enjoyable
life (i.e., a life that overall contains more pleasure than pain, or
a positive balance of all things that contribute to the life’s being worth living). Suppose, furthermore, that we can painlessly
kill X and replace it with another being, Y, that has an equally
enjoyable life. If we replace X by Y, the total amount of utility
in the world will remain constant. So, it seems, the “total” view
implies that there is nothing wrong in killing X and replacing
this being by Y (provided that X and Y have equally enjoyable
lives).
Let us now take this reasoning one step further and suppose
that X is used by a third party in a way that brings some extra pleasure to the world, and then is killed and replaced by Y.
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Suppose that this pleasure could not have been obtained in any
other way. Again, it would seem that the “total” view implies
that we ought to bring X into existence, use X in the way that
generates extra pleasure, and then kill X and replace it by Y.
But what does it mean in practice?
Consider a case involving eating fish. Suppose that a certain
fish, X, has an enjoyable life, is caught and killed painlessly,
and then is replaced by another happy fish, Y. Suppose also that
X is consumed by someone who likes to eat fish and that eating fish generates a surplus of pleasure in this person, pleasure
he would not have eating only a vegetarian diet. It would seem
that the “total” view implies that, other things being equal,
there would be nothing wrong about this sort of practice. After
all, the total amount of fish pleasures and pains remains constant, while the practice creates a certain surplus of pleasure experienced by someone who likes to eat fish. So, it would seem,
the “total” view would allow for some forms of raising animals
for food and eating them. For it seems that, in principle, at least
animals like our happy fish are replaceable.
Similar arguments can be made about many other animals
and, perhaps, even some humans. This leads, however, to serious difficulties for the “total” view. For example, in one of his
papers, Dale Jamieson considers a couple planning to have only
a certain number of children. Suppose that one of their children
is miserable. The “total” view seems to imply that the couple
ought to eliminate this child and replace it with a happier one.
After all, such an action would increase the balance of happiness (Jamieson 1983, 142-145). But this result seems highly
counterintuitive. Michael Lockwood offers another hypothetical example. He envisages a company, call it “Disposapup,”
that breeds pups to provide pets for families. It also takes the
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pets back in cases in which someone does not want to have a
pet any more or, at least, does not want to have a pet for a while.
Thus, imagine that a family wants to take a vacation and that
they get bored with a particular dog which had outgrown its
cuteness. In such a case, “Disposapup” will accept a return, kill
the dog painlessly, and then (when the family is ready after its
vacation) provide them with another similarly cute pup. Like
Jamieson, Lockwood argues that Singer’s version of utilitarian
theory implies that there is nothing wrong with “Disposapup”
(Lockwood 1979, 168). It opens doors to many similar repugnant implications for Singer’s version of utilitarianism.
Kemmerer claims that these sorts of results are not really
implied by utilitarian theory per se but rather by Singer’s “total” view interpretation of utilitarianism. Because they follow
from this view, Kemmerer finds the “total” view unacceptable.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in the previous section, her arguments against the “total” view are unconvincing. So, let us
consider again the limits and implications of replaceability.

The Limits of Replaceability
Let us recall the considerations offered in the first section.
One can conceive a child now. In effect, this child will have
some defect but, overall, this child will also have a reasonably
happy and good life. Alternatively, one can wait few months
and conceive a child then. In effect, this child will have no defects at all and thus will have a very happy and good life. Under
those conditions, it seems that one ought to wait. These sorts
of considerations suggest that, at the very least, potential beings are replaceable. That is, it seems that we can replace one
possible being (i.e., the being who does not yet exist but would
exist depending on our actions) with another possible being.
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But can we extend this implication to already existing beings? That is, are there any actual (rather than merely potential)
beings who are also replaceable? Singer argues that self-consciousness makes a difference and that self-conscious (and not
merely conscious) beings are not replaceable. The reason for
that is that such beings have some understanding of their future. Hence, arguably, they also have some preferences regarding their future. In particular, other things being equal, such
beings would desire to continue their existence in the future,
would desire not to be killed in the future, would desire to be
free now from worries about the future, and so on. Any act of
killing would thwart these preferences. Furthermore, it could
also cause suffering resulting from the anticipation of the premature death. Consequently, other things being equal, it would
be wrong to kill such a being.
The example regarding a really-miserable child, offered by
Jamieson and discussed in the previous section, is a special
case. This case raises special questions related to the issue of
euthanasia. These questions are too complex to discuss fully
here. But I would argue that, in some circumstances (e.g., when
suffering is excruciating and cannot be alleviated, and when
death is inevitable), euthanasia may be morally permissible.
Under such conditions, other things being equal (e.g., putting
to one side their own anxiety and misery as well as legal considerations and possible penalties), it may be both reasonable
and moral to terminate the life of such a child. I do not see
that cases of this sort raise special additional problems for the
utilitarian theory and the “total” view. On the contrary, in such
cases, the utilitarian theory seems to be in harmony with intuitive considerations. So, I will put such cases to the side.
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A much different case would involve a child who has some
defect yet this defect is not severe enough to make her life really miserable. I would argue that, if such a child is self-conscious (and not merely conscious), the considerations offered
two paragraphs earlier would be pertinent. So, in such a case,
the child would not be really replaceable.
This brings us to the final kind of case in which we deal with
merely conscious and not self-conscious beings. Recall the
company “Disposapup,” described by Michael Lockwood. Let
us assume also that small pups are not self-conscious. Suppose
that a family gets such a pup, keeps it for a few months, then
discards it when the pup outgrows its cuteness, or when they
want to go on a vacation, or when they want to have a different
pup, or in any similar circumstances. What would be wrong
about this sort of practice? It seems that a theory like Singer’s
does not have resources to argue that, in principle, small pups,
or fish, or perhaps even chickens are not per se replaceable.
It does not follow, however, that the utilitarian theory has no
resources to argue against this sort of practice on other grounds.
Kemmerer herself offers several reasons for thinking that, in
practice, what we actually do to animals has devastating results
for us, our families, our society, and our environment. Thus,
even if many animals are replaceable in principle (or, other
things being equal), we may have conclusive reasons not to
replace them in practice (for other things are not equal). Some
of these reasons will be considered in the next section.

Are Other Things Really Equal?
To begin, let us consider some effects of standard procedures
in almost every animal laboratory. Educators repeatedly wonder why prospective doctors and scientists arrive at schools
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“sensitive, concerned, idealistic, morally aware, and infused
with a desire to promote health and alleviate illness and suffering, yet emerge four years later cynical, hardened, brutalized,
and rigid, their ideals and enthusiasm forgotten” (Rollin 1981,
110). As one observer noticed, “once you’ve been here a few
days, you lose respect for all living things” (Orlans 1998, 132).
The reason why it happens seems to be that human and veterinary medicine requires students to perform extensive and painful experiments on animals. Kemmerer suggests that these unnecessary and frequently cruel experiments challenge the very
moral sensibilities of practitioners and, in effect, badly damage
the desire and hope to heal animals and treat them with at least
minimal level of respect.
Working in the meat industry frequently has even more devastating effects. First, factory husbandry causes animals excruciating suffering. In fact, the animals in factory farms are
so miserable that the replaceability considerations simply do
not apply. In paradigm examples when these considerations
are used, one happy being is replaced by another happy being while, in effect, we generate some surplus of pleasure. Yet
animals tortured in factory farms are not happy; on the contrary, they are so miserable that their lives are most likely not
worth living. Consequently, if we continue with this practice,
we would be replacing one miserable animal with another. Because suffering of animals in factory farms is so enormous, it
is hard to see how this way of producing meat is conducive to
generating a good balance of utility. Consequently, it’s hard to
see how factory farms could be defended on either the “prior
existence” or “total” interpretation of the utilitarian theory. (An
exception would be cases where the benefits of such a practice
outweigh the harms caused to animals and there is no alterna-
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tive way to bring about those benefits without causing suffering
to animals.)
Second, using up lots of energy and producing many substances that pollute the environment, factory farms also have
further very serious negative effects. Finally, and this is a very
interesting part of her essay, Kemmerer brings to our attention
additional facts concerning how the meat industry affects people who raise animals for food (see Eisnitz 1997). It turns out
that even officially sanctioned institutionalized killing for the
“benefit of humanity” has serious negative effects on those who
do the deed. One of these effects is a dramatic “hardening” of
their moral sensibilities. For example, slaughterhouse workers
admit to excessive and unnecessary cruelty toward the animals
they perpetually kill. One of them reported the following:
The worst thing, worse than the physical danger, is the
emotional toll. If you work in that stick pit for any period of time [killing pigs], you develop an attitude that
lets you kill things but doesn’t let you care. You may
look a hog in the eye that’s walking around down in the
blood pit with you and think, God, that really isn’t a
bad-looking animal. You may want to pet it. Pigs down
on the kill floor have come up and nuzzled me like a
puppy. Two minutes later I had to kill them—beat them
to death with a pipe. I can’t care...
Every sticker [slaughterhouse killer] I know carries
a gun, and every one of them would shoot you. Most
stickers I know have been arrested for assault. A lot of
them have problems with alcohol. They have to drink,
they have no other way of dealing with killing life,
kicking animals all day long. If you stop to think about

© Between the Species, 2011

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 14, Issue 1

97
Stefan Sencerz

it, you’re killing several thousand beings a day (Eisnitz
1997, 87).
Eisnitz discovered also that “with nearly thirty-six injuries or
illnesses for every one hundred workers, meat packing is the
most dangerous industry in the United States” (271). The long
term effect of slaughterhouse work is “a system that places
nearly as little value on human life as it does on animal life”
(273). Consequently, it causes numerous undesirable consequences for humans. It is very likely that puppy mills, like the
one described by Jamieson, would have similarly negative effects on people who work there. They would probably have
further questionable implications for those who buy pets from
such a company and then dispose of them at the slightest inconvenience.
To sum up, Kemmerer is correct that the utilitarian theory
has many resources that can be used to show that, even if certain ways of using animals are not wrong per se, because they
do not harm animals, they still may be wrong on other grounds.
Specifically, they may be wrong because of their negative side
effects; i.e., the consequences for us all, other animals, and our
environment. She is probably correct in claiming that utilitarians could explore more fully those aspects of their theory. All
of this does not add up, however, to an argument that some
merely-conscious animals are not replaceable per se. That is, I
fail to see that Kemmerer has provided convincing reasons to
reject the replaceability considerations.
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Utilitarianism and the Treatment of Animals
Revisited
It is easy to underestimate the nuances of the sophisticated
version of utilitarian theory used by Singer. He himself points
to some complications in the 2nd edition of his Practical Ethics (as well as in other writings), and it is a bit unfortunate that
Kemmerer has focused mostly on the first edition of his book.
Singer observes, in particular, that one significant change between these two editions includes the distinction between two
levels of moral reasoning that he adopted from Oxford philosopher R.M. Hare; namely, the distinction between the everyday
intuitive level and the more reflective, critical level (Singer
1993, X; cf. Hare 1976, 1981).
The intuitive level of moral reasoning includes our everyday,
common-sense morality. This level includes our moral dispositions, attitudes, emotions, and general rules that we apply in
most of our ordinary circumstances. R.M. Hare brought to our
attention several constraints that such rules must satisfy. As
he noticed, we use these intuitive rules when we do not have
enough time for critical thinking, or when there are other reasons not to trust our critical skills. To use one example, ordinary people tend to be biased towards their own interests and
the interests of their loved ones; e.g., parents making decisions
about organ transplants tend to overestimate benefits for their
children and also tend to favor the interests of their children in
comparison with the interests of other children. So, if they were
to make their moral decisions solely on the principle of utility,
very likely they might overestimate the value of their actions
for them and their loved ones, and underestimate the value of
their actions for others. Consequently, they likely might make
unfair decisions. To counteract this potential bias, it may be
safer to act on more simple intuitive rules requiring that all
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humans ought to be treated equally and that people who have
conflicts of interests should recuse themselves from making the
final decisions. In addition, we tend to show weakness of will
(i.e., we do not always do what we think is right). For this reason, it seems as if very complex rules allowing for multiple
exceptions would be hard to internalize and follow. Thus, intuitive rules need to be relatively simple and easy to internalize
and apply. Furthermore, our knowledge is limited and we do
not have indefinite time to make our moral decisions. Again,
this provides a reason for not using solely the principle of utility and adopting instead relatively simple and easy to follow
rules.
How do we decide, however, which intuitive rules are the
correct ones? We do it at the critical level which assumes that
an agent has perfect knowledge, is not a victim of weakness of
will, is not biased towards his or her own interests, has enough
time to think about all relevant matters, and so on. Thus, the
critical level has several functions. First, we use it when we
decide how to design our intuitive-level rules. Second, we use
it when we discover that those principles are in conflict, so we
need to adjudicate between them. (For example, we encounter an example analogous to Kant’s case of an innocent person
chased by bandits and we realize that we cannot save his life
without lying. So, we realize we must break one of the intuitive
rules and the only relevant question is which rule to break.)
Third, we use it when we encounter an unusual case for which
those rules are not designed. Finally, we use it when it’s clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are conclusive reasons to
depart from intuitive-level rules. (In addition to two levels of
normative thinking, Hare proposes also a meta level that allows
us to define moral concepts, develop ways of arguing about
normative issues, and so on.)
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According to Hare, at the critical level but only at that level,
we ought to use straightforward utilitarian considerations and
base our reasoning on the idea of bringing about the best possible balance of utility. It is rather clear that the question—
“what kinds of beings are per se replaceable?”—would be addressed at the level of critical thinking. It seems that we have
reasons to think that self-conscious beings are not replaceable
even in principle. But we also have some utilitarian reasons to
think that, other things being equal, merely conscious beings
are probably replaceable.
Our job is not finished, however, once these sorts of questions are answered. We still need to address issues about how
to apply these considerations in practice or what kinds of rules
we should develop and follow at the intuitive level of thinking.
Now we have to take into account the fact that these rules must
be reasonably simple and easy to internalize and follow; they
must counterbalance our bias, prevent the development of bad
habits, and so on. Taking all of this into account, it seems that
we should assume that, even if some animals are replaceable
in principle, many of them are not replaceable in practice. In
particular, it seems that, in practice, a company of disposable
puppies would not be a good means to bring about a good balance of utility. Let us restate some of the reasons why.
As is stipulated by Jamieson, the employees of this company
would be required to kill undesirable pups. If this is the case,
however, they would be under the same kinds of pressures as
the current workers in animal husbandry. We have already seen
how devastating this work is for their moral sensibilities. They
are frequently cruel not only to animals but also to humans. In
fact, most of them have serious problems with guns, drugs, and
alcohol and many are arrested for assaults. In addition, suppose
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that we accept for our society a rule that there is nothing wrong
about treating a young pup as if he were a mechanical toy not
able to feel anything. Specifically, suppose we accept that there
is nothing wrong about killing him or her for a mere matter
of convenience. Imagine now that young people internalize
this rule and start applying it to their own pups. Very likely we
would create generations of people who have badly damaged
their characters and, in effect, are willing to treat in the same
way not only young (that is, merely conscious) pups but also
adult dogs, other animals, and perhaps even fellow human beings. Now, arguably, adult mammals are not merely conscious
but also self-conscious (even if this is only a rudimentary selfconsciousness). Thus, if our considerations from the earlier
sections are correct, they are not replaceable even in principle.
Similarly, except for very small children and people who are
very severely mentally handicapped, human beings are selfconscious and hence not replaceable. Thus, a rule allowing us
to treat young pups as replaceable would very likely lead generations of people to abuse animals and perhaps even humans.
To wit, a rule allowing for treating pups as replaceable does not
seem conducive to producing desirable social utility. We have
good consequentialist reasons to reject such a rule.
There are further consequentialist reasons against the practice of disposing of pups for the reason of mere convenience.
This practice would be conducive to generating good consequences only if the owners have a very detached attitude to
their pets. A more loving attitude would lead them to miss their
animals when they are gone, which would count as suffering
or disutility. It seems, however, that a detached attitude to pets,
including treating them as if they were literally disposable mechanical toys, is not conducive to the well-being of either pets
or their owners. To explain why, I am going to rely on my own
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example. Some 5 years ago I went to a local animal shelter and
adopted my first dog; several months later she “adopted,” with
my consent, her playmate, also a rescue. Since then, my life has
changed in many quite unexpected ways.
To start with some seeming negatives, our interactions have
not been free from some sacrifice on my part. For example, my
travels are now less easy than they used to be. Also, I pay their
sometimes quite significant veterinarian bills. Furthermore,
taking care of my dogs has forced me to totally change my
lifestyle. I used to work late into the night and stay in bed until
late in the morning. Now, I go to bed early and wake up way
before dawn. Initially, those changes were painful to me, painful enough to doubt whether I would be able to accept them if
I cared little for my dogs. But motivated by what is good for
them, I have adjusted. In turn, our interactions have changed
my life in many positive ways. For one thing, I have learned
more discipline. In particular, we start almost every day with
a long roam through a natural environment (we live close to
several parks and bodies of water). Next, I have lost some 70
or 80 pounds and dramatically increased the level of my health
and well-being. Finally, my dogs have given me many joys and
pleasures that are incomparable with anything I have previously experienced in my interactions with other animals and
nature. To put things simply, from a purely self-interested point
of view, adopting my dogs was one of the best decisions of my
entire life. But this decision is not only very good for me, it is
also very good for my rescued dogs which are as happy as any
other dogs I have known.
There is a very important factor involved in this story which
it is good to emphasize now. Namely, I would not have developed my new habits, leading to the improvement of my weight,
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health, and the level of my well-being, if I had treated my dogs
as if they were mere disposable mechanical devices. That is,
one essential factor in our relationship is that it is based on
love and respect, as opposed to treating my animals as mere
expendable things that can be replaced as a matter of mere convenience. This crucial element is exactly what has led to overall
good consequences both for me and them. Precisely because
of this factor, I am not willing to treat my pups as if they are
replaceable. In fact, I would not be willing to treat them as such
even if, as a matter of principle, they were replaceable. The upshot of this discussion is this. Our loving relations with animals
seem more conducive to generating a good balance of utility
than relations in which we are more detached and treat them as
if they were mechanical toys. But once we establish this sort
of relation, it is unlikely that replacing the loved animal would
be as neutral for our well-being as Jamieson “Disposapup”
example suggests. On the contrary, the practice of replacing
animals would cause us lots of suffering. Again, we find strong
consequentialist reasons to think that even small pups are not
replaceable in practice (even if they can, perhaps, be replaceable in principle).
Are there, however, any animals that are replaceable even at
the level of intuitive thinking? I would argue that a reasonably
clear line of demarcation could perhaps be drawn at the level
of fish and other aquatic life. Animals such as shrimps or mollusks or fish have both very simple mental lives and are easily distinguishable from mammals and birds. There are many
people who, rather than practicing pure vegetarianism, eat fish
and seafood or even gain pleasure from the practice of catching
fish. These people do not develop bad habits like those who
work in the meat industry and do not end up abusing birds,
mammals, and humans. On the contrary, many of them stick
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with their pesco-vegetarian diet and are as respectful of other
forms of life as they should be.

Conclusion
To sum up, in this paper I have attempted to address several
aspects of utilitarian theory. I have argued that there are convincing reasons to accept the “total” interpretation of this view.
I argued, next, that utilitarianism implies that merely conscious
beings, but not self-conscious beings, are replaceable in principle. On these two issues I disagree with Kemmerer. I have
argued, furthermore, that she has offered many convincing
reasons to think that, even if some animals are replaceable in
principle, at least from a utilitarian point of view, we should not
conclude that they are also replaceable in practice. The reason
for this is that, because of various side effects, adopting a rule
allowing for replacing them would have an undesirable long
run utility. I have suggested, finally, that a reasonably clear demarcation line, allowing to treat some beings as replaceable,
can perhaps be drawn at the level of organisms that are currently classified as so-called seafood.
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